DUI Case Law

1. DMV - MAY NOT SUSPEND DRIVER'S LICENSE FOR DRUNK BOATING
Cinquegrani v. DMV (C.A. 2nd, 6/3/08, B199859) 08 C.D.O.S. 6754
State law does not authorize the Department of Motor Vehicles to
automatically suspend the driver’s licenses of individuals convicted
of boating while intoxicated.

2. DRUNK DRIVING - RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF EXTENDED "LOOK-BACK" PRIORS
PERIOD: People v. Treadway (C.A. 4th, 6/3/08, G038824) 08 C.D.O.S. 6719
Agreeing with People v. Sweet (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 78 and People v.
Forrester (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1021, court holds that application of
10-year look-back period extended from 7 years does not violate ex
post factor prohibition. Stogner v. California (2003) 539 U.S. 607,
which addressed an expired statute of limitations, does not affect
validity of Sweet and Forrester.

3. DRUNK DRIVING - USE OF UNMARKED CAR
Dyer v. DMV (C.A. 3rd, 5/23/08, C054971) 08 C.D.O.S. 6313
Fact that detaining officer was driving unmarked car, even if a
violation of Vehicle Code section 40800, did not render subsequent
arrest for DUI unlawful. Vehicle Code section 40800 applies only to
traffic officers whose exclusive or main purpose is to enforce traffic
laws. In any event, remedy for 40800 violation is exclusion of
testimony in speed-related offense, not DUI evidence.

4. DRUNK DRIVING - GOVERNMENT RIGHT TO PRESENT RETROGRADE EXTRAPOLATION EVIDENCE. People v. Warlick (Superior Court Appellate Division, San Diego,
3/11/08, JAD08-01) 08 C.D.O.S. 5908. DA had right to introduce evidence of "retrograde extrapolation" to prove BA level was .08 at time defendant drove car. Baker v. Gourley (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1263 does not prohibit People from proving .08 with such evidence. Baker involved admin per se laws and not criminal proceeding.

5. EXPERTS - HEARSAY USED BY EXPERT
People v. Bordelon (C.A. 1st, 5/14/08, A114023) 08 C.D.O.S. 5874
Trial court abused discretion by excluding defendant's statements to
parole officer psychologist which expert used to base opinion. Since
expert's opinion is "no better than the facts on which it is
based" (People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 618), experts
generally should be allowed to testify as to all facts upon which they
base their opinions (People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 948, 1014)
unless detailed explanation puts inadmissible hearsay before the jury.
Here statement was neither irrelevant, incompetent or unreliable. But
evidentiary errors harmless.

6. GATED COMPLEXES ARE NOT PUBLIC PLACES, BUT INSTEAD ARE PRIVATE PROPERTY, NOT SUBJECT TO PROHIBITIONS AGAINST DRINKING IN PUBLIC. [PEOPLE V. KROHN (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1294, 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 60].

See also People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 824, 98 Cal Rptr. 2d 232 (warrantless search cannot be justified by police observations made from a position to which the officer has not been expressly or implicitly invited -- thus, the public or private nature of a police officer's vantage point is a controlling factor in determining the lawfulness of officer's warrantless observations of citizens' conduct inside the privacy of their homes).

See also Hudson v. Michigan (2006) 547 U.S. 586, 591, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 165 L. Ed. 2d 56 & Herring v. United States (2009) 129 S. Ct. 695, 700, 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 -- wherein Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, and the conservative majority move to undo, restrict or even abolish the exclusionary rule established by Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. t. 683, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 -- and which has been the rule of law for almost 50 years.

7. BRACAMONTE MOTION (People v. Bracamonte (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 644).
When a defendant is charged with a "status" enhancement (such as having a prior conviction or having committed a crime while on bail in another case), he or she may move for bifurcation of the trial proceedings so that the jury deciding the current charge is not prejudiced by being informed of the "status" enhancing allegation. (See also People v. Calderon (1994) 9 Cal.4th 69.).

8. BRADY MATERIALS (Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, 88 [83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215].) Due process requires the prosecution to disclose exculpatory evidence that is material to the defendant's guilt or innocence, or to punishment. This duty includes disclosure of material evidence impeaching prosecution witnesses. Exculpatory evidence is material if it creates a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the evidence been disclosed.

9. DOYLE ERROR (Doyle v. Ohio (1976) 426 U.S. 610, 618 [49 L.Ed.2d 91, 98.].)
The prosecution is not allowed to impeach a defendant's exculpatory statements by referring to defendant's having remained silent after receiving Miranda warnings.

10. ESTEYBAR MOTION (Esteybar v. Municipal Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 119.)
A motion to reduce a wobbler to a misdemeanor pursuant to Penal Code �17(b).

11. FARETTA RIGHTS (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [45 L.Ed.2d 562]).
Upon a basic showing of competence, a criminal defendant is entitled, on demand, to represent himself or herself. (But see People v. Martinez (2000) 528 U.S. 152 [145 L.Ed.2d 597] holding that there is no federal constitutional right to self-representation on appeal.)

12. GRIFFIN ERROR (Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 [14 L.Ed.2d 106]).
A prosecutor is not permitted, either expressly or by direct implication, to comment in the presence of the jury on a defendant's exercise of the right against self-incrimination.

13. HARVEY WAIVER (People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754).
Absent a waiver by defendant, a sentencing court is not permitted to rely upon information relating to counts dismissed in accordance with a plea bargain.

14. HITCH-TROMBETTA MOTION (People v. Hitch (1974) 12 Cal.3d 641; California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479 [81 L.Ed.2d 413]).
Upon a showing that the loss or destruction by law enforcement of exculpatory evidence infringes on defendant's due process rights, the defendant may seek sanctions ranging from dismissal to suppression of certain evidence to favorable jury instructions.

15. MIRANDA RIGHTS (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694]).
Before engaging in custodial interrogation of a crime suspect, a police officer must advise the suspect of his or her rights against self-incrimination and right to counsel.

16. MURGIA MOTION (Murgia v. Municipal Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 286).
Defendant may be entitled to a dismissal of criminal charges upon a showing of selective prosecution for improper purposes, amounting to a violation of right to equal protection of law.

17. PITCHESS MOTION (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531).
Upon a proper prima facie showing by a defendant charged with a crime against a law enforcement officer (such as resisting arrest), the defense may be entitled to discovery of complaints by other people against the officer in order to try to show a pattern of aggressive behavior by the officer. (See also City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 47, describing the codification of Pitchess motion procedures and privileges, i.e., Evidence Code section 1043 applies to any case in which the defendant can show good cause for the discovery, materiality to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation, and reasonable belief that the governmental agency identified has the records or information from the records.)

18. RAMEY WARRANT (People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263).
Absent an arrest warrant or exigent circumstances, the arrest of a crime suspect in his or her own home is unlawful.

19. SERNA MOTION (People v. Serna (1985) 40 Cal.3d 239).
A delay of more than one year between an arrest and the filing of misdemeanor charges is presumptively prejudicial and 6th Amendment rights attach. (But see People v. Belton (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1425.).

20. STARE DECISIS DOCTRINE (Auto Equity Sales Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450). All California courts exercising inferior jurisdiction are required to follow decisions of courts exercising superior jurisdiction. When there is a conflict of appellate decisions, stare decisis does not apply. The inferior jurisdiction can and must choose between the conflicting decisions.

21. TERRY STOP (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 [20 L.Ed.2d 889]).
Police may perform a pat down search for weapons where there is reason to believe the suspect is armed and dangerous.

22. VICKERS HEARING (People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451).
An evidentiary hearing held to establish the facts for a violation of probation. (Vickers extended the due process rights of accused parole violators in Morrissey to accused probation violators.).

23. WEST PLEA (People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595)
West is the seminal case discussing the legality of plea bargaining in California, and is cited for many, many legal propositions. However, a "West plea" is most likely to stand for a plea which "does not constitute an express admission of guilt but only a consent to be punished as if guilty." (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1334.) Typically, the defendant stipulates to a factual basis for the plea. (See, e.g., People v. Westbrook (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 220, 223 [factual basis from grand jury transcripts].).

24. 352 MOTION (Evidence Code �352)
A motion to exclude evidence on the basis of undue prejudice and other criteria listed in the statute.

25. HEARING (Evidence Code �402).
A hearing held outside the presence of the jury to decide the admissibility of evidence.